ted演講中英文演講稿示例

ted演講中英文演講稿篇一：TED演講中英對照1

At every stage of our lives we make decisions that will profoundly influence the lives of the people we're going to become, and then when we become those

people, we're not always thrilled with the decisions we made. So young people pay good money to get tattoos removed that teenagers paid good money to get.

Middle-aged people rushed to divorce people who young adults rushed to marry. Older adults work hard to lose what middle-aged adults worked hard to gain. On and on and on. The question is, as a psychologist, that fascinates me is, why do we make decisions that our future selves so often regret?

在我們生命的每個階段，我們都會做出一些決定，這些決定會深刻影響未來我們自己的生活，當我們成爲未來的自己時，我們並不總是對過去做過的決定感到高興。所以年輕人花很多錢洗去當還是青少年時花了很多錢做上的紋身。中年人急着跟年輕時迫不及待想結婚的人離婚。老年人很努力的揮霍着作爲中年人時不停工作所賺的錢。如此沒完沒了。作爲一個心理學家，讓我感興趣的問題是，爲什麼我們會做出讓自己將來常常後悔的決定？

Now, I think one of the reasons -- I'll try to convince you today — is that we have a fundamental misconception about the power of time. Every one of you knows that the rate of change slows over the human lifespan, that your children seem to

change by the minute but your parents seem to change by the year. But what is the name of this magical point in life where change suddenly goes from a gallop to a crawl? Is it teenage years? Is it middle age? Is it old age? The answer, it turns out, for most people, is now, wherever now happens to be. What I want to convince you today is that all of us are walking around with an illusion, an illusion that history,

our personal history, has just come to an end, that we have just recently become the people that we were always meant to be and will be for the rest of our lives. 我認爲其中一個原因——而我今天想說服你們的——就是我們對時間的力量有個基本的錯誤概念。你們每個人都知道變化的速度隨着人的年齡增長不斷放慢，孩子們好像每分鐘都有變化，而父母們的變化則要慢得多。那麼生命中這個讓變化突然間從飛速變得緩慢的神奇轉折點應該叫什麼呢？是青少年時期嗎？是中年時期嗎？是老年階段嗎？其實對大多數人來說，答案是，現在，無論現在發生在什麼。今天我想讓大家明白的是，我們所有人都在圍繞着一種錯覺生活，這種錯覺就是，我們每個人的過去，都已經結束了，我們已經成爲了我們應該成爲的那種人，在餘下的生命中也都會如此。

Let me give you some data to back up that claim. So here's a study of change in people's personal values over time. Here's three values. Everybody here holds all of them, but you probably know that as you grow, as you age, the balance of these values shifts. So how does it do so? Well, we asked thousands of people. We asked half of them to predict for us how much their values would change in the next 10 years, and the others to tell us how much their values had changed in the last 10 years. And this enabled us to do a really interesting kind of analysis, because it allowed us to compare the predictions of people, say, 18 years old, to the reports of people who were 28, and to do that kind of analysis throughout the lifespan.

我想給你們展示一些數據來支持這個觀點。這是一項關於人們的個人價值觀隨時間變化的研究。這裏有3種價值觀。每個人的生活都與這三個價值觀相關，但是你們可能知道，隨着你們慢慢長大，變老，這三個價值觀的平衡點會不斷變化。到底是怎麼回事呢？我們詢問了

數千人。我們讓他們當中一半的人預測了一下在未來10年中，他們的價值觀會發生多大的改變，讓另一半人告訴我們在過去的10年中，他們的價值觀發生了多大的變化。這項調查可以讓我們做一個很有趣的分析，因爲它可以讓我們將大約18歲左右的人的預測同大約28歲左右的人的答案相比較，這項分析可以貫穿人的一生。

Here's what we found. First of all, you are right, change does slow down as we age, but second, you're wrong, because it doesn't slow nearly as much as we think. At every age, from 18 to 68 in our data set, people vastly underestimated how much change they would experience over the next 10 years. We call this the "end of history" illusion. To give you an idea of the magnitude of this effect, you can connect these two lines, and what you see here is that 18-year-olds anticipate changing only as much as 50-year-olds actually do.

這是我們的發現。首先，你們是對的，隨着我們年齡的增長，變化會減緩。第二，你們錯了，因爲這種變化並不像我們想象的那麼慢。在我們的數據庫從18歲到68歲的每一個年齡段中，人們大大的低估了在未來的10年他們會經歷多少變化。我們把這叫做“歷史終止”錯覺。爲了讓你們瞭解這種影響有多大， 你們可以把這兩條線連接起來，你們現在看到的是18歲的人羣預期的改變僅僅和50歲的人羣實際經歷的一樣。

Now it's not just values. It's all sorts of other things. For example, personality. Many of you know that psychologists now claim that there are five fundamental

dimensions of personality: neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness, extraversion, and conscientiousness. Again, we asked people how much they

expected to change over the next 10 years, and also how much they had changed

over the last 10 years, and what we found, well, you're going to get used to seeing this diagram over and over, because once again the rate of change does slow as we age, but at every age, people underestimate how much their personalities will change in the next decade.

現在不僅僅是價值觀了。其他的方面都也有變化。比如說，人格。你們當中的很多人知道現在心理學家們認爲人格可以分爲五個基本維度：神經質性，經驗汲取度，協調性，外向性和道德感。回到原來的話題，我們問人們他們期待未來的10年中自己會有多大的變化，以及他們在過去的10年中發生了多少變化，我們發現了，你們會習慣不斷地看到這個圖表，因爲又一次，變化速率隨着我們的年齡增長減慢了。但是在每一個年齡階段，人們都低估了在未來的十年中他們的人格會發生多大的改變。

And it isn't just ephemeral things like values and personality. You can ask people about their likes and dislikes, their basic preferences. For example, name your best friend, your favorite kind of vacation, what's your favorite hobby, what's your

favorite kind of music. People can name these things. We ask half of them to tell us, "Do you think that that will change over the next 10 years?" and half of them to tell us, "Did that change over the last 10 years?" And what we find, well, you've seen it twice now, and here it is again: people predict that the friend they have now is the friend they'll have in 10 years, the vacation they most enjoy now is the one they'll enjoy in 10 years, and yet, people who are 10 years older all say, "Eh, you know, that's really changed."

而且不光是像價值觀和人格這樣的臨時性的特質。你們可以問問人們關於他們喜好和厭惡的事，他們基本的偏好。比如說，說出你最好朋友的名字，你最喜歡什麼樣的假期，你最大的愛好是什麼，你最喜歡什麼樣的音樂。人們可以說出這些事情。我們讓他們當中的一半人告訴我們，“你認爲這在未來10年內會改變嗎？”讓另一半告訴我們，“這個在過去十年內變化了嗎？”我們的發現是，嗯，這個圖你們已經看過2次了，再展示一次：人們推測他們現在的朋友在未來10年中還會是他們的朋友，他們喜歡的度假之地在未來10年內還會是他們喜歡的地方，然而，年長10歲的人都會說：“嗯，你知道，這確實不一樣了。” Does any of this matter? Is this just a form of mis-prediction that doesn't have consequences? No, it matters quite a bit, and I'll give you an example of why. It bedevils our decision-making in important ways. Bring to mind right now for

yourself your favorite musician today and your favorite musician 10 years ago. I put mine up on the screen to help you along. Now we asked people to predict for us, to tell us how much money they would pay right now to see their current favorite musician perform in concert 10 years from now, and on average, people said they would pay 129 dollars for that ticket. And yet, when we asked them how much they would pay to see the person who was their favorite 10 years ago perform today, they say only 80 dollars. Now, in a perfectly rational world, these should be the same number, but we overpay for the opportunity to indulge our current preferences because we overestimate their stability.

這有什麼關係嗎？這只是一種並不會有什麼後果的錯誤的預測嗎？不，這有很大的關係，我會舉例告訴你們爲什麼。它在很多重要的方面困擾着我們做決定。現在想想你們此時此刻最

ted演講中英文演講稿篇二：李世默TED演講稿(中英文)

李世默TED：

中國崛起與“元敘事”的終結

Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn’t born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know that humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About on third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows. All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries

and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil. The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. Now. This story also became a bestseller. According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it. Fool me once… The rest is history. In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions. So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections. There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won’t last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies

has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are uecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let’s first look at the larger context. Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you. The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings. The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party

being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department. The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotation pyramid made up of there components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu. Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels. There, they enter high, officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system. China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don’t get

me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone. It’s just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown. Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election. Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 42 years old. Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%. Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mine-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is

ted演講中英文演講稿篇三：楊瀾TED演講：重塑中國的年輕一代(中英文對照)

楊瀾TED演講：重塑中國的年輕一代（中英文對照）

The night before I was heading for Scotland, I was invited to host the final of “China’s Got Talent” show in Shanghai with the 80,000 live audience in the stadium. Guess who was the performing guest? Susan Boyle. And I told her, “I’m going to Scotland the next day.” She sang beautifully, and she even managed to say a few words in Chinese. [Chinese] So it’s not like “hello” or “thank you,” that ordinary stuff. It means “green onion for free.” Why did she say that? Because it was a line from our Chinese parallel Susan Boyle — a 50-some year-old woman, a vegetable vendor in Shanghai, who loves singing Western opera, but she didn’t understand any English or French or Italian, so she managed to fill in the lyrics with vegetable names in Chinese. (Laughter) And the last sentence of Nessun Dorma that she was singing in the stadium was “green onion for free.” So [as] Susan Boyle was saying that, 80,000 live audience sang together. That was hilarious.

來蘇格蘭（做TED講演）的前夜，我被邀請去上海做”中國達人秀“決賽的評委。在裝有八萬現場觀衆的演播廳裏，在臺上的表演嘉賓居然是（來自蘇格蘭的，因參加英國達人秀走紅的）蘇珊大媽（Susan Boyle)。我告訴她，“我明天就要啓程去蘇格蘭。” 她唱得很動聽，還對觀衆說了幾句中文，她並沒有說簡單的”你好“或者”謝謝“，她說的是——“送你蔥”（Song Ni Cong)。爲什麼？這句話其實來源於中國版的“蘇珊大媽”——一位五十歲的以賣菜爲生，卻對西方歌劇有出奇愛好的上海中年婦女（蔡洪平）。這位中國的蘇珊大媽並不懂英文，法語或意大利文，所以她將歌劇中的詞彙都換做中文中的蔬菜名，並且演唱出來。在她口中，歌劇《圖蘭朵》的最後一句便是“Song Ni Cong”。當真正的英國蘇珊大媽唱出這一句“中文的”《圖蘭朵》時，全場的八萬觀衆也一起高聲歌唱，場面的確有些滑稽（hilarious)。

So I guess both Susan Boyle and this vegetable vendor in Shanghai belonged to otherness. They were the least expected to be successful in the business called entertainment, yet their courage and talent brought them through. And a show and a platform gave them the stage to realize their dreams. Well, being different is not that difficult. We are all different from different perspectives. But I think being different is good, because you present a different point of view. You may have the chance to make a difference.

我想Susan Boyle和這位上海的買菜農婦的確屬於人羣中的少數。她們是最不可能在演藝界成功的，而她們的勇氣和才華讓她們成功了，這個節目和舞臺給予了她們一個實現個人夢想的機會。這樣看來，與衆不同好像沒有那麼難。從不同的方面審視，我們每個人都是不同的。但是我想，與衆不同是一件好事，因爲你代表了不一樣的觀點，你擁有了做改變的機會。 My generation has been very fortunate to witness and participate in the historic transformation of China that has made so many changes in the past 20, 30 years. I

remember that in the year of 1990, when I was graduating from college, I was applying for a job in the sales department of the first five-star hotel in Beijing, Great Wall Sheraton — it’s still there. So after being interrogated by this Japanese manager for a half an hour, he finally said, “So, Miss Yang, do you have any questions to ask me?” I summoned my courage and poise and said, “Yes, but could you let me know, what actually do you sell?” I

didn’t have a clue what a sales department was about in a five-star hotel. That was the first day I set my foot in a five-star hotel.

我這一代中國人很幸運的目睹並且參與了中國在過去二三十年中經歷的鉅變。我記得1990年，當我剛大學畢業時，我申請了當時北京的第一家五星級酒店——長城喜來登酒店的銷售部門的工作。這家酒店現在仍在北京。當我被一位日本籍經理面試了一個半小時之後，他問到，“楊小姐，你有什麼想問我的嗎？”，我屏住呼吸，問道“是的，你能告訴我，具體我需要銷售些什麼嗎？” 當時的我，對五星級酒店的銷售部門沒有任何概念，事實上，那是我第一次進到一家五星級酒店。

Around the same time, I was going through an audition — the first ever open audition by national television in China — with another thousand college girls. The producer told us they were looking for some sweet, innocent and beautiful fresh face. So when it was my turn, I stood up and said, “Why [do] women’s personalities on television always have to be beautiful, sweet, innocent and, you know, supportive? Why can’t they have their own ideas and their own voice?” I thought I kind of offended them. But actually, they were impressed by my words. And so I was in the second round of competition, and then the third and the fourth. After seven rounds of competition, I was the last one to survive it. So I was on a national television prime-time show. And believe it or not, that was the first show on Chinese television that allowed its hosts to speak out of their own minds without reading an approved script. (Applause) And my weekly audience at that time was between 200 to 300 million people.

我當時也在參加另一場“面試”，中國國家電視臺的首次公開試鏡，與我一起參與選拔的還有另外1000名大學女畢業生。節目製作人說，他們希望找到一位甜美，無辜（LOL），漂亮的新鮮面孔。輪到我的時候，我問道“爲什麼在電視屏幕上，女性總應該表現出甜美漂亮，甚至是服從性的一面？爲什麼她們不能有她們自己的想法和聲音？“我覺得我的問題甚至有點冒犯到了他。但實際上，他們對我的表現印象深刻。我進入了第二輪選拔，第三輪，第四輪，直至最後的第七場選拔，我是唯一一個走到最後的試鏡者。我從此走上了國家電視臺黃金時段的熒幕。你可能不相信，但在當時，我所主持的電視節目是中國第一個，不讓主持人念已經審覈過的稿件的節目（掌聲）。我每週需要面對兩億到三億左右的電視觀衆。

Well after a few years, I decided to go to the U.S. and Columbia University to pursue my postgraduate studies, and then started my own media company, which was unthought of during the years that I started my career. So we do a lot of things. I’ve interviewed more than a thousand people in the past. And sometimes I have young people approaching me say, “Lan, you changed my life,” and I feel proud of that. But then we are also so fortunate to witness the transformation of the whole country. I was in Beijing’s bidding for the

Olympic Games. I was representing the Shanghai Expo. I saw China embracing the world and vice versa. But then sometimes I’m thinking, what are today’s young generation up to? How are they different, and what are the differences they are going to make to shape the future of China, or at large, the world?

幾年以後，我決定來美國哥倫比亞大學繼續深造，之後也開始運營自己的媒體公司，這也是我在職業生涯初始時所沒有預料到的。我的公司做很多不同的業務，在過去這些年裏，我訪談過一千多人。經常有年輕人對我說，“楊瀾，你改變了我的人生”，我對此感到非常自豪。我也幸運的目睹了整個國家的轉變：我參與了北京申奧和上海世博會。我看到中國在擁抱這個世界，而世界也進一步的接受中國。但有時我也在想，今天的年輕人的生活是什麼樣的？他們（與我們相比）有什麼不同？他們將帶給中國，甚至整個世界的未來一些怎樣的變化？ So today I want to talk about young people through the platform of social media. First of all, who are they? [What] do they look like? Well this is a girl called Guo Meimei — 20 years old, beautiful. She showed off her expensive bags, clothes and car on her microblog, which is the Chinese version of Twitter. And she claimed to be the general manager of Red Cross at the Chamber of Commerce. She didn’t realize that she stepped on a sensitive nerve and aroused national questioning, almost a turmoil, against the credibility of Red Cross. The controversy was so heated that the Red Cross had to open a press conference to clarify it, and the investigation is going on.

So far, as of today, we know that she herself made up that title — probably because she feels proud to be associated with charity. All those expensive items were given to her as gifts by her boyfriend, who used to be a board member in a subdivision of Red Cross at Chamber of Commerce. It’s very complicated to explain. But anyway, the public still doesn’t buy it. It is still boiling. It shows us a general mistrust of government or

government-backed institutions, which lacked transparency in the past. And also it showed us the power and the impact of social media as microblog.

我想通過社交媒體來談一談中國的年輕人們。首先，他們是誰，他們是什麼樣子？這是一位叫郭美美的女孩兒，20歲，年輕漂亮。她在中國版的Twitter上——新浪微博上，炫耀她所擁有的奢侈品，衣服，包和車。她甚至宣稱她是中國紅十字會的工作人員。她沒有意識到她的行爲觸及了中國民衆極爲敏感的神經，這引發了一場全民大討論，民衆開始質疑紅十字會的公信力。中國紅十字會爲了平息這場爭議甚至舉辦了一場記者會來澄清，直至今日，對於”郭美美事件“的調查仍在繼續，但我們所知道的事實是，她謊報了她的頭銜，可能是因爲她的虛榮心，希望把自己和慈善機構聯繫起來。所有那些奢侈品都是她的男朋友給她買的，而那位”男朋友“的確曾經是紅十字會的工作人員。這解釋起來很複雜，總之，公衆對他們的解釋仍然不滿意，這仍然是在風口浪尖的一件事。這件事體現出（中國社會）對長期不透明的政府機關的不信任，同時也表現出社交媒體（微博）巨大的社會影響力。

Microblog boomed in the year of 2010, with visitors doubled and time spent on it tripled. , a major news portal, alone has more than 140 million microbloggers. On

Tencent, 200 million. The most popular blogger — it’s not me — it’s a movie star, and she has more than 9.5 million followers, or fans. About 80 percent of those microbloggers are young people, under 30 years old. And because, as you know, the traditional media is still heavily controlled by the government, social media offers an opening to let the steam out a little bit. But because you don’t have many other openings, the heat coming out of this opening is sometimes very strong, active and even violent.

微博在2010年得到了爆炸性的增長，微博的訪問用戶增長了一倍，用戶的訪問時間是09年的三倍。新浪（)，一個最主要的微博平臺，擁有1.4億的微博用戶，而騰訊擁有兩億用戶。（在中國）最有名的微博主——不是我——是一位電影明星，她擁有近九百五十萬”粉絲“。接近80％的微博用戶是年輕人，三十歲以下。因爲傳統媒體還在政府的強力控制之下，社交媒體提供了一個開放的平臺進行了一些（民衆觀點的）分流。因爲這樣分流的渠道並不多，從這個平臺上爆發出的能量往往非常強烈，有時候甚至過於強烈。

So through microblogging, we are able to understand Chinese youth even better. So how are they different? First of all, most of them were born in the 80s and 90s, under the one-child policy. And because of selected abortion by families who favored boys to girls, now we have ended up with 30 million more young men than women. That could pose a potential danger to the society, but who knows; we’re in a globalized world, so they can look for girlfriends from other countries. Most of them have fairly good education. The illiteracy rate in China among this generation is under one percent. In cities, 80 percent of kids go to college. But they are facing an aging China with a population above 65 years old coming up with seven-point-some percent this year, and about to be 15 percent by the year of 2030. And you know we have the tradition that younger generations support the elders financially, and taking care of them when they’re sick. So it means young couples will have to support four parents who have a life expectancy of 73 years old.

通過微博，我們可以更好的瞭解到中國的年輕一代。首先，他們中的大多數都出生在八零九零年代，在獨生子女的生育政策的大背景下長大。因爲偏好男孩的家庭會選擇性的墮胎，現在（中國）的年輕男性的數量多過年輕女性三千萬，這可能帶來社會的不穩定（危險），但是我們知道，在這個全球化的社會中，他們可能可以去其他國家找女朋友。大多數人都擁有良好的教育。這一代中國人中的文盲率已經低於1％。在城市中，80％的孩子可以上大學，但他們將要面對的是一個，有接近7％的人口都是老年人的社會，這個數字會在2030年會增長到2030年。在這個國家，傳統是讓年輕人來從經濟上和醫療上來支持老年人，這意味着，一對年輕的夫妻將需要支持四個平均年齡是73歲的老人。

So making a living is not that easy for young people. College graduates are not in short supply. In urban areas, college graduates find the starting salary is about 400 U.S. dollars a month, while the average rent is above $500. So what do they do? They have to share space — squeezed in very limited space to save money — and they call themselves “tribe of ants.” And for those who are ready to get married and buy their apartment, they figured out they have to work for 30 to 40 years to afford their first apartment. That ratio in America would only cost a couple five years to earn, but in China it’s 30 to 40 years with the skyrocketing real estate price.

所以對於年輕人而言，生活並不是容易。本科畢業生也不在是緊缺資源。在城市中，本科生的月起薪通常是400美元（2500人民幣），而公寓的平均月租金卻是500美元。所以他們的解決方式是合租——擠在有限的空間中以節省開支，他們叫自己”蟻族。“ 對於那些準備好結婚並希望購買一套公寓的中國年輕夫婦而言，他們發現他們必須要不間斷的工作30到40年纔可以負(轉 載於: :ted演講中英文演講稿)擔得起一套公寓。對於同樣的美國年輕夫婦而言，他們只需要五年時間。

Among the 200 million migrant workers, 60 percent of them are young people. They find themselves sort of sandwiched between the urban areas and the rural areas. Most of them don’t want to go back to the countryside, but they don’t have the sense of belonging. They work for longer hours with less income, less social welfare. And they’re more vulnerable to job losses, subject to inflation, tightening loans from banks, appreciation of the renminbi, or decline of demand from Europe or America for the products they produce. Last year, though, an appalling incident in a southern OEM manufacturing compound in China: 13 young workers in their late teens and early 20s committed suicide, just one by one like causing a contagious disease. But they died because of all different personal reasons. But this whole incident aroused a huge outcry from society about the isolation, both physical and mental, of these migrant workers.

在近兩億的涌入城市的農民工中，他們中的60％都是年輕人。他們發現自己被夾在了城市和農村中，大多數人不願意回到農村，但他們在城市也找不到歸屬感。他們工作更長的時間卻獲得更少的薪水和社會福利。他們也更容易面臨失業，受到通貨膨脹，銀行利率，人民幣升值的影響，甚至美國和歐盟對於中國製造產品的抵制也會影響到他們。去年，在中國南方的一個製造工廠裏，有十三位年輕的工人選擇了結束自己的生命，一個接一個，像一場傳染病。他們輕生的原因各有不同，但整個事件提醒了中國社會和政府，需要更多的關注這些在精神上和生理上都與外界脫節的年輕農民工人。

For those who do return back to the countryside, they find themselves very welcome locally, because with the knowledge, skills and networks they have learned in the cities, with the assistance of the Internet, they’re able to create more jobs, upgrade local agriculture and create new business in the less developed market. So for the past few years, the coastal areas, they found themselves in a shortage of labor.

對於那些回到農村的年輕人，他們所經歷的城市生活，所學到的知識，技巧和建立的社會網絡，讓他們通常更受歡迎。特別是在互聯網的幫助下，他們更有可能獲得工作，提升農村的農業水平和發展新的商業機會。在過去的一些年中，一些沿海的城鎮甚至出現了勞動力短缺。 These diagrams show a more general social background. The first one is the Engels

coefficient, which explains that the cost of daily necessities has dropped its percentage all through the past decade, in terms of family income, to about 37-some percent. But then in the last two years, it goes up again to 39 percent, indicating a rising living cost. The Gini coefficient has already passed the dangerous line of 0.4. Now it’s 0.5 — even worse than that in America — showing us the income inequality. And so you see this whole society getting frustrated about losing some of its mobility. And also, the bitterness and even resentment towards the rich and the powerful is quite widespread. So any accusations of corruption or backdoor dealings between authorities or business would arouse a social outcry or even uest.

這些圖片展現出整體的社會背景。第一張圖片是恩格斯係數（食品支出佔總消費支出的比例），可以看到在過去的十年中，食物和生活必需品在家庭消費中的比例有所下降（37％），然後在過去的兩年中，這項指數上升到39％，說明近兩年中生活成本的攀升。基尼係數早